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Abstract—Internet of Drones (IoD) is expected to play a central
role in many civilian and military applications, that require
sensitive and mission-critical information to be processed. It is
therefore vital to ensure the security and privacy of IoD. However,
unlike traditional networks, IoD has a broader attack surface and
is highly energy-constrained, which hinder the direct adoption
of standard cryptographic protocols for IoD.
We propose an energy-efficient cryptographic framework
(namely IoD-Crypt), which can potentially meet the requirements
of battery-limited IoD. Specifically, IoD-Crypt utilizes special
precomputation techniques and self-certified primitives to gain
significant computation and communication efficiency over the
standard public key cryptography (PKC) suites. Our integrations
and optimizations are broadly applicable to key exchange, digital
signature and public key encryption schemes that encompass
generic applications of PKC in IoD. We prove that IoD-Crypt is
secure in the random oracle model. We fully implemented IoD-
Crypt on two common drone processors, namely 8-bit AVR and
32-bit ARM, and conducted an in-depth energy analysis. Our
experiments (on both platforms) showed that IoD-Crypt offers
up to 48× less energy consumption compared to standard
techniques. We have open-sourced our implementations for wide
adoption and public testing purposes.
Index Terms—internet of drones, drone security, network
security, public key cryptography, lightweight cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Drones (IoD), as an emerging mobile Internet of
Things (IoT) system, is a layered network control architecture
that is designed to control and coordinate unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs or drones) [1]. IoD has many applications
including, but not limited to, military operations, package
delivery, traffic control, environmental monitoring and disaster
recovery [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Due to the sensitive
and strategic information involved in IoD, it is essential to
guarantee their security and privacy. However, due to the low
computational power, the energy and bandwidth limitations,
this becomes a highly challenging task [3].
While there have been extensive studies on the optimization
of security mechanisms on IoT, their direct adoption for IoD
might not yield feasible and secure solutions. This has been
further emphasized in a recent study that investigated the at-
tacks (and their potential countermeasures) on IoT applications
[7]. In [7], the authors point out that the majority of the attack
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vectors could be mitigated if the existing security mechanisms
and standards were properly implemented considering the
requirements and characteristics of such systems. Therefore,
there is a critical need to harness the state-of-the-art security
mechanisms and algorithmic optimizations to offer a viable
cryptographic solution for IoD, with minimal impact to the
battery lives of resource-constrained drones.
We outline the security vulnerabilities and the state-of-the-
art solutions that are considered for aerial drones as follows.
A. Overview of Existing Cryptographic Approaches
• Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions: In [8], Pleban et
al. showed a successful hack and hijack of an AR.Drone 2.0
(equipped with a 32-bit ARM processor) resulted from the
lack of cryptographically secure communication channels. Son
et al. [9] pointed out that most of the commodity (civilian)
drone telemetry systems do not use cryptography to secure the
communication. Thus, they proposed a fingerprinting method
that may provide some authentication for drones.
There has been a lot of work on the identification of the se-
curity vulnerabilities of the current drone configurations [10],
[11], [12]. For instance, Shin et al. [10] showed how to extract
frequency hopping sequence of FHSS-type drone controllers
using a software defined radio. Son et al. [11] demonstrated
attacks that can cause drones to crash by exploiting the
resonance frequency of MEMS gyroscopes. Habibi et al. [12]
demonstrated stealth attacks (with potential defense strategies
combining software and hardware) that alter the sensors’ data
and even change the direction of the drone. Another vulner-
ability outlined in [13] targets the MAVLink protocol and
results in disabling the ongoing mission of the attacked drone.
Garg et al. [14] proposed a framework based on probabilistic
data structures that considers UAVs as intermediate aerial
nodes to facilitate real-time analysis and cyber-threat detection
mechanisms.
Recently, Lin et al. [3] identified the differences of drone
networks from traditional ones and the potential challenges to-
wards securing drones. Their study showed that the design and
deployment of specifically tailored lightweight cryptographic
protocols are essential for energy-constrained drones.
• Cryptographic Techniques: The earlier studies [15], [16]
suggest the adoption of conventional cryptographic techniques
such as RSA and AES on FPGAs to provide efficient solutions.
Symmetric ciphers with white-box cryptography [17] were
also considered in drone settings to target the mitigations of
drone capturing attacks. Recently, certificateless cryptographic
protocols were proposed for drone-based smart city applica-
tions [18]. These protocols aim to minimize the certification
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Fig. 1: Energy consumption of IoD-Crypt compared to standard PKI techniques (ECDSA, ECIES on standardized elliptic
curves) on two common drone processors.
overhead (e.g., transmission) that might be costly for drones.
However, they might still be computationally expensive for
energy-constrained drones since they include multiple elliptic
curve (EC) scalar multiplications [18]. Cheon et al. [19]
proposed a linearly homomorphic authenticated encryption
scheme to secure drone systems, but this scheme might also
be too costly for resource-constrained drones, due to heavy
homomorphic computations.
There is a significant need for an open-source, energy-
efficient, and comprehensive cryptographic framework which
can vastly enhance the state-of-the-art crypto schemes.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we created a cryptographic framework that we
refer to as IoD-Crypt, which can meet some of the stringent
energy and bandwidth needs of IoD applications.
Below, we give some desirable features of IoD-Crypt.
• A Comprehensive Energy-Efficient Cryptographic Frame-
work: IoD-Crypt exploits the synergies among various cryp-
tographic primitives such as efficient elliptic curves and con-
stant storage precomputation techniques while avoiding the
costly certification overheads by employing a self-certified
cryptographic system. We apply our optimizations to a wide-
variety of standard suites such as a key exchange, a digital
signature, and a public key encryption. Our theoretical and
experimental analysis, inlined with the requirements of IoD
outlined in [1], [3], confirms that IoD-Crypt can meet the
needs of IoD, specifically, in drone-to-drone and drone-to-
infrastructure scenarios.
• Improved Side-Channel Resiliency: Some of the opti-
mization techniques we employed in our framework aim
to speed up EC scalar multiplication by converting it to
EC additions [20], [21]. For instance, the digital signa-
ture (BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr) and public key encryption
(DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES) schemes that are proposed as a
part of the IoD-Crypt framework, do not require any EC scalar
multiplication in their signing and encryption, respectively.
Therefore, they achieve improved side-channel resiliency as
compared to the base schemes by avoiding the attacks that
target EC scalar multiplication [22], [23].
• Cryptographic Energy Usage Analysis on Two Common
Platforms: We identify two microprocessors, namely, 8-bit
AVR [12], [24], [25] and 32-bit ARM [26], [27], from different
families that are commonly used in small aerial drones (e.g.,
Crazyflie [26]). We implemented our framework on both
of these processors and assessed the energy consumption.
Moreover, we tested the standard techniques and provided
an in-depth comparison in §VI. Our results showed that IoD-
Crypt offers up to 13× and 48× lower energy consumption
on 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM, respectively.
• Broad Applicability to Various Cryptographic Constructs:
We identify various other (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) based schemes that can benefit from our
proposed methods (see §IV-A). We discuss how IoD-Crypt can
enhance the performance of such schemes.
• Open-Source Cryptographic Framework for Wide Adop-
tion: We open-sourced our optimized framework for wide
adoption and testing purposes at the link below.
https://github.com/ozgurozmen/IoD-Crypt
• Potential Applications to IoTs: The techniques used in IoD-
Crypt can be useful for other IoT applications that require
energy efficiency. Specifically, any IoT application relying on
energy-limited devices (e.g., medical implantables, wireless
sensors in smart cities/homes) can benefit from IoD-Crypt.
Moreover, 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM processors, on which
we tested IoD-Crypt, are not only common in drones but also
in various other IoT applications [28], [29].
Differences between this article and its preliminary ver-
sions in [2], [21]: In this article, we harness the proposed
techniques in two preliminary works to propose an integrated
framework, IoD-Crypt. We provide improved implementations
on drone microcontrollers that includes algorithmic optimiza-
tions. (i) We improve our framework, Dronecrypt, proposed
in [2] to further enhance its efficiency and energy consump-
tion, with the techniques in [21]. (ii) In Dronecrypt, only
32-bit ARM processor was considered and in [21], only 8-
bit AVR processor was considered. Whereas, in this version,
3we implement our improved framework on both 8-bit AVR
drone processor [12], [24], [25], and 32-bit ARM processor
(that Crazyflie 2.0 is equipped with [26], [27]). We evaluate
our improved framework in terms of efficiency, energy con-
sumption, and storage overhead. (iii) We provide the security
proof of self-certified keys in [30] for the first time in this
paper, that were proposed/adopted without a security proof
in [21], [30]. (iv) We provide a formal security analysis of
IoD-Cryptby capturing the security properties of its underlying
cryptographic primitives. (v) We propose new parameter sets
for our optimizations that offers higher security. (vi) We dis-
cuss how IoD-Crypt meets the well-established requirements
of IoD networks presented in [1], [3] and elaborate on the
broader impacts of our optimizations and proposed framework,
specifically, we highlight some other EC-based schemes that
can benefit from our optimization.
II. BUILDING BLOCKS
We first outline our notation in Table I.
TABLE I: Notation followed to describe schemes.
Fp Finite Field
G Generator Group Point
N A large prime
〈x,U〉 Private/Public key pair
〈d,D〉 System Wide Private/Public key pair
Γ Precomputation Table
Ek IND-CPA Encryption via key k
Dk IND-CPA Decryption via key k
× Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication (Emul)
· Multiplication in Fq
KDF Key Derivation Function
H Cryptographic Hash Function H : {0, 1}∗ → ZN
EC points are shown in capital bold letters (e.g., B)
1) FourQ Curve [31]: FourQ is a special EC that is defined
by the complete twisted Edwards equation [32] E/Fp2 : −x2+
y2 = 1+dx2y2. FourQ is known to be one of the fastest elliptic
curves that admits 128-bit security level [31]. Moreover, with
extended twisted Edwards coordinates, FourQ offers the fastest
EC addition algorithms [31], that is extensively used in our
optimizations. All of our schemes are realized on FourQ.
2) Boyko-Peinado-Venkatesan (BPV) Generator [20]: BPV
generator is a precomputation technique that converts an EC
scalar multiplication to multiple EC additions with the cost
of a small constant-size table storage. The security of BPV
on EC discrete logarithm problem (DLP) setting is well-
investigated [33], [34] and depends on the affine hidden
subset sum problem. The offline (key generation) and online
algorithms of BPV are described in Algorithm 1.
3) Arazi-Qi (AQ) Self-Certified Key Exchange [30]: AQ
self-certified key exchange minimizes the certificate transmis-
sion and verification overhead. In Algorithm 2, we give key
generation and shared secret algorithms where the keys are
generated and distributed by a key generation center (KGC).
Nodes store the value xa ×D so that the shared secret is
calculated with a single EC scalar multiplication. One can also
apply a technique presented in [30] to ensure that, if required,
nodes can obtain AQ keys without exposing their private
keys to the KGC. An ephemeral key exchange algorithm is
Algorithm 1 BPV Generator [20]
(Γ, v, k)← BPV.Offline(1κ):
1: Generate BPV parameters (v, k), where k and v are the
number of pairs to be precomputed and the number of ele-
ments to be randomly selected out of k pairs, respectively,
for 2 < v < k.
2: r′i
$← Z∗N , R′i ← r′i ×G, i = 0, . . . , k − 1.
3: Set precomputation table Γ = {r′i,R′i}k−1i=0 .
(r,R)← BPV.Online(Γ, v, k,params):
1: Generate a random set S ⊂ [0, k − 1], where |S| = v.
2: r ← ∑i∈S r′i mod N , R← ∑i∈SR′i.
Algorithm 2 AQ Self-Certified (SC) Scheme [30]
(d,D)← AQ.Setup(1κ) (offline)
1: d
$← Z∗N . D←− d×G
(xa,Ua)← AQ.Kg(1κ, IDa) (offline)
1: ba
$← Z∗N , Ua ←− ba ×G.
2: xa ← [H(IDa,Ua) · ba + d]
(Kab,Kba)← AQ.SharedSecret(IDa,Ua, IDb,Ub)
Node A Node B
Send (IDa,Ua)
Send (IDb,Ub)
Node A: Kab = xa × [H(IDb||Ub)×Ub +D]
Node B: Kba = xb × [H(IDa||Ua)×Ua +D]
also proposed using AQ keys, namely, AQ-Hang [35]. In
AQ-Hang, for each key exchange, a fresh ECDH key is
calculated and added to the AQ shared secret to calculate
ephemeral keys that are forward secure and self-certified.
III. MODELS
A. System Model
Self-certified cryptography requires a trusted key generation
center to generate and distribute the keys to the entities in the
system. Therefore, we assume that there is a trusted authority
that can compute and distribute the self-certified keys to the
drones. This is a feasible assumption as Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) requires that all drones between 0.6
to 55 lb should be registered with the U.S. Department of
Transportation [1]. For instance, as the trusted authority, U.S.
Department of Transportation (or FAA) can issue the keys to
the drones.
As depicted in Figure 2, our main system components are
the drones, and there are also recipients that communicate
with the drones. These recipients may include entities such as
Zone Service Providers (ZSPs), control stations or servers. For
example, ZSPs provide navigation information and coordinate
drones in a predetermined area, control stations can be used to
4Fig. 2: Our system model.
send commands to non-autonomous drones, and servers can
be used to store the sensors’ data received from the drones [1],
[3], [4]. The communication among these entities and drones
occurs over a (insecure) broadcast channel and therefore it
should be secured. Note that IoD networks are energy con-
strained, the components are mobile and the communication
range is limited [1], [3].
B. Security Model
We assume that only the KGC is trusted. Following [36],
we consider a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adver-
sary A which is able to tap the communications between
parties and intercept/modify messages. A is also able to
request the key pairs of any user ID in the system via the
(UID, xID) ← KeyQry(ID) oracle. When the key pair of
a user is exposed via the KeyQry(·) oracle the user will
be marked as corrupted. Since the keys are self-certified, we
assume that the adversary is able to verify the validity of the
keys via the KeyVer(·) oracle.
Inspired by the work of Canetti and Krawczyk [36], we
define the security of a key generation scheme in the following
definition. To capture a real-world scenario, given the system-
wide public key, we assume that A is able to observe a
polynomially-bounded number of key pairs. A is also able to
verify the validity of any key pair via the KeyVer(·) oracle.
At some point, A outputs a key pair for the target user T .
A wins the experiment if the key pair is valid and T was never
queried to KeyQry(·) oracle.
Definition 1. A self-certified key generation scheme SC-KG =
(Setup,Kg) is secure if A has a negligible advantage in the
following experiment ExptKG-SecurityA with a challenger C.
– (params)← SC-KG.Setup(1κ)
– (UT , xT )← AKeyQry(·),KeyVer(·)(params)
– If 1← KeyVer(UT , xT ), return 1. Else return 0.
A wins if user T was never queried to the KeyQry(·) or-
acle. The advantage AdvKG-SecurityA of A is defined as
Pr[ExptKG-SecurityA = 1].
We define the notion of existential unforgeability under
chosen message attack (EU-CMA) for a signature scheme
SGN = (Kg,Sig,Ver) through the following definition.
Definition 2. Existentially Unforgeability under Chosen Mes-
sage Attack (EU-CMA) experiment ExptEU-CMASGN for a signature
scheme SGN = (Kg,Sig,Ver) is defined as follows.
– (sk , pk)← SGN.Kg(1κ)
– (m∗, σ∗)← ASGN.Sig(·)(pk)
A wins the above experiment if 1← SGN.Ver(m∗, σ∗, pk)
and m∗ was not queried to SGN.Sig(·) oracle. The
EMU-CMA advantage AdvEU-CMASGN of A is defined as
Pr[ExptEU-CMASGN = 1]
We define the notion of indistinguishability under cho-
sen message attack (IND-CPA) for encryption scheme Σ =
(Kg,Enc,Dec) through the following definition.
Definition 3. IND-CPA experiment Expt INC-CPAΣ for an en-
cryption scheme Σ = (Kg,Enc,Dec) between the adversary
A and a challenger C is defined as follows.
– (sk , pk)← Σ.Kg(1κ)
– (m0,m1)← AΣ.Enc(·)(pk)
– C flips a coin b← {0, 1}, computes cb ← Σ.Enc(mb, pk)
and returns cb to A.
– b′ ← AΣ.Enc(·)(pk)
A wins the above experiment if b = b′. The IND-CPA
advantage Adv IND-CPAΣ of A is defined as Pr[b = b′] ≤ 12 + .
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Design Rationale: Our main idea is as follows.
(i) The transmission and verification of certificates introduce
a significant communication and computation burden which
might be expensive for many IoD applications. Moreover,
drones are required to be registered with central authorities
(e.g., FAA). We observed that self-certified cryptographic keys
as in [30] can be used to bridge this gap and enhance the
security and performance of IoD. Specifically, we integrate
self-certified keys into Schnorr signatures [37] and Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [38] to achieve
efficient authentication and confidentiality tools. We refer to
such improved schemes as BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr and
DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES, respectively. Therefore, our ap-
proach eliminates the burden of certificates and harnesses a
central trusted authority for the initial key distribution that fits
IoD in compliance with the FAA requirements.
(ii) We alleviate the computational overhead of our schemes
by harnessing special precomputation techniques such as the
BPV precomputation technique (see Algorithm 1). We adopt
a variation of the BPV technique, the Designated BPV (i.e.,
DBPV) [21], which permits an efficient use of BPV in ECIES.
Finally, we realize all of our improved schemes on FourQ
curve [39], which is one of the most computationally efficient
ECs. Specifically, the efficiency of EC additions in FourQ
complements BPV/DBPV techniques.
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be provably secure. We fill this research gap by providing
a formal security proof (in the random oracle model) for
the AQ self-certified keys. We then analyze the security
of our proposed schemes by capturing the integration of
self-certified keys and DBPV into Schnorr and ECIES. Our
proposed framework consists of a signature scheme and a
CPA secure encryption scheme to achieve authentication and
confidentiality, respectively.
1) BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr: We adopt the BPV tech-
nique in the Schnorr signature scheme to speed up the EC
scalar multiplication required in Schnorr. Moreover, we use
AQ public/private key pair in our Schnorr algorithms to
avoid the burden of communicating certificates by achieving
self-certification. In PKI-based schemes, before the signature
verification, the public key of the signer (i.e., via its certificate)
should be verified. Note that [H(IDb||Ub) × Ub + D] part
in the verification step is equivalent to verifying a certificate
without any extra communication cost. Moreover, it can be
calculated and stored before the online steps. Our scheme is
provided in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr with AQ Keys
(Γ, x,U)← BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Kg(1κ):
1: KGC generates its keys d $← Z∗N , D←− d×G
2: b
$← Z∗N , U←− b×G.
3: x← [H(ID,U) · b+ d].
4: Generate (v, k) as in BPV.Offline(·) Step 1
5: r′i
$← Z∗N , R′i ← r′i ×G, i = 0, . . . , k − 1.
6: Set precomputation table Γ = {r′i,R′i}k−1i=0 .
(s, e)← BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Sig(m,x,Γ):
1: Generate a random set S ⊂ [0, k − 1], where |S| = v.
2: r ← ∑i∈S r′i mod N , R← ∑i∈SR′i.
3: e← H(m||R), s← (r − e · x) mod N
b← BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Ver(m, 〈s, e〉,U, ID):
1: R′ ← e× [H(ID||U)×U+D] + s×G
2: If e = H(m||R′) then set b = 1 as valid, else b = 0 .
2) DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES: ECIES is a public key en-
cryption scheme also included in TinyECC [40], that offers
forward-secure authentication and encryption. In the standard
ECIES scheme, two EC scalar multiplications are required,
one to generate ephemeral key pair, and one to generate a
one-time key. We also adopt the Designated BPV technique
that allows to speed up both of these EC scalar multiplications
in ECIES by replacing them with EC additions [21].
The BPV precomputation technique is extended for “Desig-
nated” elliptic curve points, where not only the EC scalar mul-
tiplication over the generator (G) but also over other precom-
puted curve points are stored [21]. This significantly benefits
the public key encryption schemes (e.g., ECIES [38]) where an
EC scalar multiplication is required over the receiver’s public
key. Although DBPV eliminates EC scalar multiplications,
the caveat is the small storage overhead. However, public
key encryption schemes are usually suitable for applications
where multiple entities (e.g., drones) send messages/reports
to a single command center/base station (e.g., ZSPs) using
their public key. This allows easy adoption of DBPV to public
key encryption schemes (especially in the IoD networks) since
the storage overhead introduced would be tolerable, which is
confirmed by our experiments (see §VI).
For the ECIES scheme, as in Algorithm 4, we generate the
designated precomputation table over [H(ID||U)×U+D],
that is based on the public key of the receiver.
Algorithm 4 DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES with AQ Keys
(Γ, x,U)← DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Kg(1κ):
1: KGC generates its keys d $← Z∗N , D←− d×G
2: b
$← Z∗N , U←− b×G.
3: x← [H(ID,U) · b+ d].
4: Generate (v, k) as in BPV.Offline(·) Step 1
5: r′i
$← Z∗N , R′i ← r′i × G, S′i ← r′i ×
[H(ID||U)×U+D], i = 0, . . . , k − 1.
6: Set precomputation table Γ = {r′i,R′i,S′i}k−1i=0 .
(c, d,R)← DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Enc(m,U, ID,Γ):
1: Generate a random set S ⊂ [0, k − 1], where |S| = v.
2: r ← ∑i∈S r′i mod N , R← ∑i∈SR′i, S← ∑i∈S S′i.
3: (kenc, kMAC)← KDF(S)
4: c← Ekenc(m)
5: d← MACkMAC (c)
m← DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Dec(x, 〈c, d,R〉):
1: S′ ← y ×R
2: (kenc, kMAC)← KDF(S′)
3: If d 6= MACkMAC (c) return invalid
4: m← Dkenc(c)
We also complement our optimized public-key primitives by
adopting lightweight symmetric ciphers. We consider Chacha
stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator [41], due to their
fast operations and well-studied security [42].
A. Broad Application to IoD and EC-based Schemes
We discuss how IoD-Crypt can meet some of the needs
of IoD networks as outlined in [1], [3]. First and foremost,
the energy efficiency of IoD-Crypt makes it a suitable choice
for IoD. Our experiments showed that IoD-Crypt offers high
energy efficiency on small drones that are equipped with 8-bit
and 32-bit processors (see §VI). Since IoD networks consist
of energy-constrained small drones [3], IoD-Crypt techniques
are preferable over the standard techniques. Moreover, since
the IoD networks usually use broadcasting for message de-
livery and may carry highly sensitive information, public key
cryptographic tools may be useful due to their scalability, non-
repudiation and public verifiability.
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can benefit various other ECDLP based schemes, that can
be useful for securing IoD networks. For instance, in [18],
certificateless key encapsulation and encryption techniques are
proposed to secure drone communications in smart cities.
The EC scalar multiplications in the certificateless hybrid
encryption scheme in [18] can be accelerated with DBPV.
Similarly, it can also benefit from the adoption of FourQ curve,
especially when considered with the DBPV due to its opti-
mized EC addition. In [43], [44], efficient digital signature and
signcryption schemes were proposed. Although these schemes
include bilinear pairing and therefore, cannot adopt FourQ
curve, they can benefit from IoD-Crypt optimizations. In [43],
signer needs to perform an EC scalar multiplication that can
be accelerated with BPV, and in [44], at the signcryption
algorithm, DBPV can be utilized to speed up a couple of
EC scalar multiplications that are necessary to generate an
ephemeral key.
B. Limitations and Potential Remedies
High energy and computational efficiency of IoD-
Crypt comes with a trade-off due to the adopted optimization
methods. First, the precomputation technique used in IoD-
Crypt requires storing a constant-size table at the signer/sender.
However, we show that with the correct parameter choices, it is
even possible to store this table in highly resource-constrained
8-bit AVR processors. Moreover, IoD-Crypt requires a trusted
authority (e.g., KGC) to compute and deliver keys to the
drones, to remove the certificate transmission and verification
overhead. As explained in our system model in §III-A, since
drones should be registered with authorities (e.g., FAA or U.S.
Department of Transportation), we believe this is a plausible
assumption for the envisioned IoD applications.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1. If an adversary A wins the experiment in
Definition 1 with non-negligible probability after making qk
key queries and qh hash queries, then one can build another
algorithm C that runs A as a subroutine and can solve the
Diffie-Hellman Problem with a non-negligible probability.
Proof. C runs the AQ.Setup(·) algorithm and passes D to
A. C aims to solve the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem on
the input of D. C keeps tables Lh and Lk to keep track of
random oracle queries and key queries, respectively.
Setup RO(·) Oracle: C implements a function H -Sim to
handle RO(·) queries to random oracles H . That is, the cryp-
tographic hash functions H are modeled as random oracles
via H -Sim as follows.
i) h← H -Sim(ID||UID, Lh): If R ∈ Lh then H -Sim re-
turns the corresponding value h← Lm(ID||UID). Oth-
erwise, it returns h $← Z∗N as the answer, and inserts
(ID||UID, h) into Lm.
Queries of A: A can query RO(·) and KeyQry(·) oracles on
any message of its choice up to qH and qk times, respectively.
1) Handle RO(·) queries: A ’s queries on H is handled by
H -Sim function as described above.
2) Handle KeyQry(·) queries: To answer A ’s key queries
on any user of its choice ID, C inserts ID into Lk and
continues as follows.
i) Pick xID
$← Z∗N and h $← Z∗N .
ii) Compute UID ← h−1 × (xID ×G−D).
iii) C checks if Lk(ID||UID) 6= ⊥, C aborts and outputs 0.
Else, it sets Lk(ID||UID)← h.
iv) Lastly, C outputs (xID, UID) and sets Lk(ID) ←
(xID, UID).
Output of A: Finally, A outputs a forgery key pair for any user
of its choice ID∗ as (xID∗ ,UID∗). By Definition 1, A wins
the if the below conditions hold.
i) 1← KeyVer(xID∗ ,UID∗ , ID∗)
ii) ID∗ /∈ Lk
C’s Solution to the DH problem: If A fails to output a key
pair], C also fails in solving the DL problem, and therefore,
C aborts and returns 0.
Otherwise, if A outputs a successful forgery (xID∗ ,UID∗),
using the forking lemma [45], C can rewind A to get a
second forgery for user ID∗ as (x˜ID∗ , U˜ID∗) where xID∗ 6=
x˜ID∗ and UID∗ = U˜ID∗ with an overwhelming proba-
bility. Given the forgeries (xID∗ ,UID∗) and (x˜ID∗ , U˜ID∗)
on ID∗, based on [45], we know that H(ID∗||UID) 6=
H(ID∗||U˜ID).
Given 1 ← KeyVer(xID∗ ,UID∗ , ID∗) and
1 ← KeyVer(x˜ID∗ , U˜ID∗ , ID∗), C computes
b ← xID∗−x˜ID∗
H(ID∗||UID)+H(ID∗||U˜ID) and solve for the discrete
logarithm of D as d← xID∗ −H(ID∗||UID) · b.
Theorem 2. The signature scheme proposed in Algorithm 3
is EU-CMA secure in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof. Based on the results of Theorem 1, we know that
the self-certified key used in Algorithm 3 is secure. More-
over, The distribution of keys generated by Algorithm 2 is
indistinguishable from uniform random due [37]. As shown
in the previous works [20], [33], one can see that the
distribution of BPV output r is statistically close to the
uniform random with the appropriate choices of parameters
(v, k). Following this, if the ephemeral randomness r in
BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Sig Step 2 is obtained from
BPV generator, then BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr is secure
given the hardness of the Affine Hidden Subset Sum prob-
lem [33], [46]. Therefore, based on these results, the signature
scheme proposed in Algorithm 3 is secure in the sense of
Definition 2 under the DL problem.
Theorem 3. The encryption scheme proposed in Algorithm 4
is IND-CPA secure in the sense of Definition 3.
Proof. The security and properties of the self-certified keys
adopted in Algorithm 4 follows from the first part of the proof
in Theorem 2. The original BPV, as shown in Algorithm 1
computes R by multiplying a random r with the generator
of the group E(Fp2 [N ]). However, due to the property of the
group E(Fp2 [N ]), in the DBPV method used in Algorithm 4,
the public key of the user, (x ·H(ID||U) · b)×G, is also a
generator of the group. Therefore, proving the randomness of
7TABLE II: Comparison of Public Key Primitives on 8-bit AVR Processor
Protocol CPU Cycles CPU Time(s)
Memory†
(Byte)
Bandwidth
(Byte)
Energy
Consumption (mJ)
Certificate
Overhead
Standard Techniques
ECDH 25, 840, 000 1.61 32 32 161.52 Yes
Ephemeral ECDH 54, 380, 000 3.40 32 32 339.86 Yes
ECDSA-Sign 28, 370, 000 1.77 32 64 177.30 Yes
ECDSA-Verify 28, 960, 000 1.81 32 64 181.01 Yes
ECIES-Encrypt 54, 450, 000 3.40 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 340.34 Yes
ECIES-Decrypt 25, 920, 000 1.62 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 161.99 Yes
IoD-Crypt
AQ 6, 940, 000 0.43 32 32 43.38 No
BPV-AQ-Hang 9, 140, 000 0.57 16416 32 57.14 No
BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Sig 2, 490, 000 0.15 16416 64 15.57 No
BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Ver 8, 310, 000 0.52 32 64 51.94 No
DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Enc 4, 290, 000 0.27 24608 32 + |c| + |MAC| 26.80 No
DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Dec 6, 980, 000 0.44 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 43.61 No
† Memory denotes private key size for sign/encrypt schemes as signer/sender stores it, memory denotes public key size for verify/decrypt schemes as verifier/receiver stores it.
the BPV output (as also studied in [20], [33]) for the DBPV
method is identical to the original BPV method. Based on
these results, the encryption scheme proposed in Algorithm 4
is secure in the sense of Definition 3, and the proof can be
obtained identical as in [38].
Parameter Choice: The security of our proposed schemes
depend on the underlying curve and BPV/DBPV parameter
choice of (v, k). As the underlying curve, we select FourQ,
that offers 128-bit security level and very fast curve operations
such as EC addition [31]. Security of BPV/DBPV depends on
the v-out-of-k different combinations that could be created
with the precomputed table. Moreover, the selection of v and
k have a trade-off between storage and computation, where
increasing k increases the storage and increasing v increases
the computation. We offer two parameter sets, specifically
v = 28, k = 256 and v = 18, k = 1024 that offer 2128
different combinations, and therefore 128-bit security level.
From these two, we focus on v = 28, k = 256 since it
requires 4× less storage, which can easily fit highly resource-
constrained processors such as 8-bit AVR.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
We fully implemented IoD-Crypt on two common drone
microprocessors and assessed the performance and energy ef-
ficiency of our schemes. We measured the energy consumption
with the formula E = V · I · t, following the works [21],
[2], [47]. We compare the costs of our optimized techniques
with the standard ones, specifically, we implemented ECDH,
ECDSA and ECIES protocols on the standardized secp256k1
curve, and adopted AES and HMAC as the symmetric ciphers.
A. Performance on 8-bit AVR Processor
Hardware Configurations: We implemented IoD-Crypt tar-
geting an 8-bit AVR ATmega 2560 processor. ATmega 2560
has a maximum frequency of 16 MHz and it is equipped with
8 KB SRAM and 256 KB flash memory. ATmega 2560
operates at V = 5 V and I = 20 mA while running at
16 MHz (full capacity), that is used to estimate the energy
consumption. Since we used IAR Embedded Workbench to
TABLE III: Comparison of Symmetric Ciphers on 8-bit AVR
Protocol (KB/s) CPUCycles†
CPU
Time (ms)
Energy
Cons. (µJ)
Standard Techniques
AES 29.339 19, 500 1.22 122.34
AES-GCM 8.890 76, 500 4.78 478.15
HMAC‡ 22.017 182, 200 11.39 1138.69
IoD-Crypt
CHACHA20 65.670 8, 300 0.52 521.89
CHACHA-POLY 23.687 35, 500 2.22 222.03
POLY1305 37.169 21, 400 1.34 133.81
† CPU cycles presented here are for a 32-byte message.
‡ SHA256 is used as the standard hash function for HMAC.
develop IoD-Crypt, our codes can be easily tested/used in other
8-bit AVR processors.
Implementation: We implemented the public key primitives
of IoD-Crypt using the open-source implementation of FourQ
library on microprocessors [47], which provides the basic
EC operations such as EC scalar multiplication, EC addi-
tion. As for the symmetric primitives, we used Weatherley’s
library [48]. We used the cycle-accurate simulator of IAR
Embedded Workbench to benchmark our schemes, as in [47].
For the standard public key primitives, we used micro-ecc [49],
that offers the lightweight implementations of standard elliptic
curves for microprocessors.
The results of our experiments are presented in Table II for
the public key primitives and in Table III for the symmetric
ones. As shown, IoD-Crypt primitives outperform their coun-
terparts in computation time and energy consumption. On the
other hand, they require a storage of 16 KB for the adoption of
BPV and 24 KB for DBPV. However, these precomputation
tables are stored as a part of the flash memory of ATmega
2560 and they take less than 10% of the memory. Moreover,
the standard public key techniques take a few seconds, that
might be infeasible for time-critical IoD applications, whereas
IoD-Crypt signature generation takes 150 ms and public key
encryption takes 270 ms.
B. Performance on 32-bit ARM Processor
Hardware Configurations: We targeted an actual drone for
our tests on 32-bit ARM processor, namely Crazyflie 2.0 [26].
8TABLE IV: Comparison of Public Key Primitives on 32-bit ARM Processor
Protocol CPU Cycles CPU Time(ms)
Memory†
(Byte)
Bandwidth
(Byte)
Energy
Consumption (mJ)
Certificate
Overhead
Standard Techniques
ECDH 8, 710, 000 51.84 32 32 6.84 Yes
Ephemeral ECDH 17, 611, 000 104.83 32 32 13.84 Yes
ECDSA-Sign 9, 412, 000 56.02 32 64 7.40 Yes
ECDSA-Verify 8, 169, 000 48.62 32 64 6.42 Yes
ECIES-Encrypt 17, 625, 000 104.91 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 13.85 Yes
ECIES-Decrypt 8, 818, 000 52.49 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 6.93 Yes
IoD-Crypt
AQ 556, 000 3.33 32 32 0.44 No
BPV-AQ-Hang 764, 000 4.55 16416 32 0.60 No
BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Sig 302, 000 1.80 16416 64 0.24 No
BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Ver 695, 000 4.14 32 64 0.55 No
DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Enc 374, 000 2.23 24608 32 + |c| + |MAC| 0.29 No
DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Dec 570, 000 3.39 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 0.45 No
† Memory denotes private key size for sign/encrypt schemes as signer/sender stores it, memory denotes public key size for verify/decrypt schemes as verifier/receiver stores it.
TABLE V: Comparison of Symmetric Ciphers on 32-bit ARM
Protocol (MB/s) CPUCycles†
CPU
Time (µs)
Energy
Cons. (µJ)
Standard Techniques
AES 0.926 5, 540 32.96 4.35
AES-GCM 0.377 13, 600 80.95 10.68
HMAC‡ 3.338 1, 540 9.14 1.21
IoD-Crypt
CHACHA20 3.554 1, 440 8.59 1.13
CHACHA-POLY 2.619 1, 960 11.65 1.54
POLY1305 13.709 370 2.23 0.29
† CPU cycles presented here are for a 32-byte message.
‡ SHA256 is used as the standard hash function for HMAC.
Crazyflie 2.0 is equipped with an STM32F4 processor (32-bit
ARM Cortex M-4 architecture) that has 192 KB SRAM and
1 MB flash memory, and operates at 168 MHz. At max
frequency, the processor requires 3.3 V and 40 mA.
Implementation: We used the Microsoft FourQ library to
implement IoD-Crypt for 32-bit ARM processor [31], [47].
This library provided the basic EC operations which we used
to build the protocols with the optimization techniques. For
our counterparts, we used micro-ecc [49] and for symmetric
primitives, we used Wolfcrypt library [50].
Table IV and Table V show the benchmarks of IoD-
Crypt and the standard techniques on STM32F4 processor.
Our experiments showed that IoD-Crypt offers up to 48×
less energy consumption. Moreover, IoD-Crypt can support
to very high message throughputs due to its high efficiency.
More specifically, with IoD-Crypt, an STM32F4 processor can
compute 555 signatures and encrypt 448 messages per second.
In our experiments, we stored the precomputation tables on the
SRAM.
C. Performance on Commodity Hardware
Considering the recipient side (e.g., command centers,
ZSPs, and servers) that are involved in IoD networks are
equipped with high-end processors, we also measured the costs
of IoD-Crypt on a commodity hardware. In our experiments,
we used an Intel i7 Skylake 2.6 GHz CPU running with Linux
16.04. Our results showed that these processors can support up
to a very large number of message throughputs so that they can
communicate with a large drone fleet easily. More specifically,
signing a message (with BPV-SC-FourQ-Schnorr.Sig)
only takes around 10 µs and encrypting a message (with
DBPV-SC-FourQ-ECIES.Enc) takes around 15 µs . Ver-
ification and decryption algorithms in IoD-Crypt only take
40−45 µs . Therefore, IoD-Crypt supports the secure commu-
nication of thousands of messages, and thereby permits a better
quality-of-service and response time, wherein recipients (e.g.,
ZSPs) may handle many drones simultaneously. We open-
sourced our codes on the 64-bit processor as well, to complete
our framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose IoD-Crypt, an efficient public-key
based cryptographic framework that is tailored for the stringent
energy and network requirements of IoD. IoD-Crypt eliminates
(i) the conventional PKI overhead with self-certified keys and
(ii) EC scalar multiplications with BPV and DBPV techniques,
and adopts FourQ curve that offers very fast curve operations
(e.g., EC addition). We prove that our improved schemes in
IoD-Crypt are secure, and provide their implementation on
two common drone processors, namely 8-bit AVR and 32-bit
ARM. Our experiments showed that IoD-Crypt offers up to
13× and 48× less energy consumption compared to standard
techniques, on 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM, respectively.
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